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Abstract
The phenomenon of radicalization is investigated within a mixed population composed of
core and sensitive subpopulations. The latest includes first to third generation immigrants.
Respective ways of life may be partially incompatible. In case of a conflict core agents
behave as inflexible about the issue. In contrast, sensitive agents can decide either to live
peacefully adjusting their way of life to the core one, or to oppose it with eventually joining
violent activities. The interplay dynamics between peaceful and opponent sensitive agents
is driven by pairwise interactions. These interactions occur both within the sensitive popula-
tion and by mixing with core agents. The update process is monitored using a Lotka-Vol-
terra-like Ordinary Differential Equation. Given an initial tiny minority of opponents that
coexist with both inflexible and peaceful agents, we investigate implications on the emer-
gence of radicalization. Opponents try to turn peaceful agents to opponents driving radicali-
zation. However, inflexible core agents may step in to bring back opponents to a peaceful
choice thus weakening the phenomenon. The required minimum individual core involve-
ment to actually curb radicalization is calculated. It is found to be a function of both the
majority or minority status of the sensitive subpopulation with respect to the core subpopula-
tion and the degree of activeness of opponents. The results highlight the instrumental role
core agents can have to hinder radicalization within the sensitive subpopulation. Some
hints are outlined to favor novel public policies towards social integration.
Introduction
The phenomenon of radicalization [1] is of central interest in the context of criminality and
terrorism. It is currently spreading all over the world including European countries. The recent
unprecedented terrorists attacks in Paris (November 13, 2015) and Brussels (March 22, 2016)
took life of respectively 130 and 32 persons with over 300 wounded in each case [2, 3]. It puts
at a very high level the burden on making substantial progress in the mastering of the issue.
Over the years sociologists and social-psychologists have contributed a good deal of work to
the phenomenon [1, 4–6]. However an understanding, which could lead to some practical
curbing of radicalization is unfortunately still lacking as dramatically demonstrated by the
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recent series of terrorist attacks in France (2015 [2, 7]) and in Brussels (2016 [3]). One promis-
ing direction is the prospect to access the huge amount of data (Big Data) which exists in the
World Wide Web. It could open a valuable source of surveillance and forecasting to prevent
some aspects of radicalization spreading. However, efficient data-mining tools are still to be
constructed yet within the constraints related to the preservation of individual privacies.
Accordingly, under the current risk of loosing control of the situation any new attempt to
tackle the issue of radicalization is valuable in itself. To identify some hints to implement novel
adequate policies towards at least the hindrance of radicalization spreading is of particular
importance. Along this line it happens that the modern field of sociophysics [8–10] where
models inspired from physics are developed to describe a large spectrum of social behaviors,
may contribute to the challenge. Among others, sociophysics includes the study of opinion
dynamics [11–14], language dynamics [9, 15], crowd behavior [9], criminal activities [16–19],
and cultural dynamics [20, 21]. Our work, focusing on a formal modeling of radicalization (see
also [22]) from the viewpoint of opinion dynamics, subscribes to this trend [23]. Therefore,
according to the analytical approaches developed in sociophysics the proposed model adopts
some assumptions that allow to simplify the scenario of reference. The complexity underlying
terrorism phenomena is thus reduced to a series of more simple local interactions monitored
by two parameters, which tune the global dynamics of the system. The focus on local interac-
tions to reach the global equilibrium state constitutes one major trend of statistical physics, i.e.,
the branch of physics from which sociophysics developed. More specifically we consider a
mixed population made up of two subpopulations, each one sharing a peculiar way of life. First
one is a core population locally rooted in the country. In contrast, the other one is an immi-
grant (two, three generations) subpopulation whose way of life is rooted in another territory.
Differences between the two ways of life may be strong, numerous and contradictory. However,
in case of a disagreement about some specific cultural habit like for instance wearing the
Islamic veil, both subpopulations do not stand at the same level of resilience. Core agents con-
sider that it is not up to them to modify their way of life or accept from newcomers behaviors
perceived as contrary to their long time country rooted cultural habits. Core agents behave
here as inflexible agents. For them it is up to newcomers including immigrants even at second
or third generation to adjust to the country prevailing way of life. It is thus up to newcomers to
either choose to live peacefully with the core population adjusting part of their habits to the
local constraints or to maintain the integrality of their habits at a cost of creating conflicts with
the core population. Accordingly, the newcomers can be considered as sensitive agents. They
can choose between two individual states either peaceful or opponent. Sensitive agents are enti-
tled to shift state from peaceful to opponent and vice-versa. In addition we make the assump-
tion that being in an opponent state may lead the corresponding agent to take part or to
support violent activities. In principle, the latter choice can be linked to the appearance of local
terrorist groups. We are dealing with a mixture of inflexible and sensitive agents in given fixed
proportions σI and σS with σI + σS = 1. However, σS is made up of two time dependent parts
σP(t) and σO(t), which are the respective proportions of peaceful and opponent sensitive agents.
At any time t σS = σP(t) + σO(t). The time dependence is driven by an internal dynamics among
sensitive agents. It is the result of pairwise interactions both among themselves between peace-
ful and opponent agents and with inflexible agents. An opponent may drive a peaceful agent to
opponent and an inflexible may drive peaceful an opponent agent. The associated dynamics is
studied using a Lotka-Volterra-like Ordinary Differential Equation. Given an initial tiny
minority of opponents we investigate the role of their activeness [24] in turning peaceful agents
to opponents via pairwise interactions. The effectiveness of their activism is materialized in the
degree of radicalization of the sensitive population against the core population. It creates a
social basis for passive supporters [25] to emerge in support to terrorists [26]. In parallel, the
Modeling Radicalization Phenomena in Heterogeneous Populations
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0155407 May 11, 2016 2 / 15
mechanism behind the dynamics of radicalization enlightens by symmetry a potential role core
inflexible agents could have in the launching of an eventual counter radicalization. By individ-
ual counter activeness core agents can contribute substantially to both curb the radicalization
spreading and in certain conditions make it shrink down to an equilibrium state where inflexi-
ble, peaceful and opponent agents co-exist. The associated required minimum core individual
involvement is calculated. It is found to be a function of both the majority or minority status of
the sensitive subpopulation with respect to the core subpopulation and the degree of activeness
of opponents. It is worth to stress that different mathematical frameworks could be used to
describe our dynamics. For instance, approaches based on evolutionary game theory [27–30]
allow to perform both computational and analytical (e.g., [31]) investigations. It requires to
define a payoff matrix and rules for local interactions to monitor the updating. In this work we
use stochastic processes based on opinion dynamics [8]. Local interactions reduce to contact
processes, which make updating rules to depend on the relative densities of the various agent
states. The choice of the current approach in the modeling arises from the aim to evaluate to
which extent the heterogeneity of a population in cultural and behavioral terms may lead to
critical and complex social phenomena as radicalization. Furthermore, it is important to
emphasize that the attribute ‘inflexible’ adopted to describe the core population stand, refers to
cultural habits and traditions which allow to peacefully coexist with individuals coming from
abroad provided they share the fundamental features of the local cultural frame. It happens
that opinion dynamics constitutes one of the most investigated topics in sociophysics and in
computational social science. For instance, its dynamics have been recently studied using the
framework of multiplex networks [32, 33] considering different social behaviors [34–38]. It
allows to understand phenomena recorded in huge social network datasets [39–41]. Opinion
dynamics allows to analyze and to model the spreading of ideas, opinions, and feelings by
reducing the study of complex social scenarios to the analysis of few variables [42]. Even terror-
ism and criminal activities may be studied by the same approach, i.e., reducing the related pro-
cess to a problem of opinion dynamics. To conclude, our results may contribute to shed a new
light on the instrumental role core agents could play to curb radicalization and establish a coex-
istence with the sensitive population. Some hints at novel public policies towards social integra-
tion are obtained.
Previous Models
In the last years several authors have worked on opinion dynamics models to analyze various
underlying behaviors, which produce social phenomena, e.g., group polarization, conformity
and extremism. In this section, we briefly review some of these investigations, which are con-
nected to our work along the topic of extreme social phenomena, especially radicalization. A
computational model for tackling political party competitions is introduced in [43]. The
authors investigate different possible occurrences of fragmentation according to variations in
the amount of important political issues and their current relevance. Different interaction pat-
terns among voters are considered using an analytical approach. The focus is on the role of
extremism in opinion dynamics with a qualitative analysis of real scenarios. The complex social
phenomenon of group polarization is described in [44] in the context of politics. In particular,
the authors propose a model based on probability theory to drive the emergence of group
polarization. The emergence of risks is shown to be related to the group polarization in a wide
range of scenarios related to political and economical issues (e.g., immigration, religion, welfare
state, human rights). The results highlight the necessity to a better understanding of the emer-
gence of extreme opinions. The connection between contradictory public opinions, heteroge-
neous beliefs and the emergence of extremism is analyzed in [45]. An agent-based model
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considers a population with different socio-cultural classes to describe the process of opinion
spreading with calculations performed on small groups of individuals (e.g., composed of 3 and
4 agents). The model constitutes a useful reference for defining models related to complex
social phenomena. Moreover, the related results suggest that the direction of the inherent
polarization effect, which occurs in the formation of a public opinion driven by a democratic
debate, is biased due to the existence of common beliefs within a population. Opinion dynam-
ics is also studied using computational approaches, e.g., by agent-based models on continuous
or discrete spaces. Such approaches require a careful attention during the implementation
phase. For instance, in the work [46] authors focus on the role of activation regimes. More pre-
cisely they compare different asynchronous updating schemes (e.g., random and uniform). The
activation regime refers to the order or scheme adopted to let agents express their opinion. As a
result, the activation regime is found to affect opinion dynamics processes in some cases (i.e.,
[46]). It is therefore of importance to clearly state which activation regime is selected to imple-
ment a dynamical model. The role of conformity in the q-voter model by arranging agents on
heterogeneous networks has been also investigated [47]. The authors showed that different
steady states may be reached by tuning the ratio of conformists versus that of nonconformists
in an agent population, which evolves according to the dynamics of the q-voter model. In our
model we do not consider complex topologies. However, the influence that may arise from dif-
ferent interaction patterns may constitute the topic of future investigations.
Mathematical Model
In order to study the emergence of radicalization in an heterogeneous population we consider
a system with N interacting agents distributed among inflexible (I), peaceful (P) and opponent
(O) agents. Each category refers to a different behavior or feeling. Inflexible and opponent
agents have behaviors mapped respectively to states s = ±1. Peaceful agents have a behavior
mapped to the state s = 0. Inflexible agents never change state (see also [48]) while peaceful and
opponent agents may shift state from one to another over time. Opponents may become peace-
ful and peaceful may become opponents. Hence, neither peaceful nor opponent agents may
assume the state of inflexible agents. Inflexible agents interact with sensitive agents both peace-
ful and opponents. During these pairwise interactions when an inflexible agent meets an oppo-
nent it may well turn the opponent to peaceful via different paths. Among those paths most are
spontaneous through normal social and friendship practices. But as it will appear latter,
exchanges could become intentional as to promote coexistence with sensitive agents via moni-
tored informal exchanges. To account for all interacting pairs a parameter α is introduced to
represent on average the rate per unit of time of encounters where opponents become peaceful
agents. In parallel and in contrast we introduce the parameter β to account on average for the
rate of success of opponents in convincing peaceful agents to turn opponents. Contrary to
inflexible agents opponents are acting intentionally to increase the support to their radical view
within the sensitive population. The value of β is a function of the power of conviction of oppo-
nents. It also takes into account the activeness of opponent agents since opponents are activists.
It is not the case of the core inflexible agents who interact spontaneously with sensitive agents
without an a priori goal. It is worth to stress that both α and βmay in principle vary over time.
However, the corresponding time scale for variation is expected to be much longer than the
time scale of the dynamics driven by pairwise interactions. This is why at the present stage of
our work α and β are assumed to be fixed and constant. Analyzing their time dependence,
which might be of great interest to get further insights on equilibriums among people belong-
ing to different cultures is left for future work. We emphasize that our analytical approach
entails to consider the system as if it was continuous, i.e., analyzing the relative densities of
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agents in the various states. A similar approach is usually followed in other contexts as epi-
demic dynamics [49, 50]. A compartmental approach to the studying of epidemics entails to
analyze the spreading of a disease by modifying the state of agents. For instance, the SIS [51]
model considers a two-state population where agents may vary their state from S (i.e., suscepti-
ble) to I (i.e., infected) and vice-versa over time. Considering the probability to get infected or
to heal the dynamics can be studied analytically defining ODEs as if the underlying system
were continuous. Going to the analytical details of our model we defined the following system
of equations
dsPðtÞ
dt
¼ asIsOðtÞ  bsOðtÞsPðtÞ
dsOðtÞ
dt
¼ bsOðtÞsPðtÞ  asIsOðtÞ
sI þ sPðtÞ þ sOðtÞ ¼ 1
ð1Þ
8>><
>>:
where σI is the constant density of inﬂexible agents, while σO(t) and σP(t) are the respective den-
sities of peaceful and opponent agents at time t. Dealing with densities the third equation of
system (1) allows to reduce the number of ODEs to one equation. In particular, choosing the
peaceful agents density σP(t) we get
dsPðtÞ
dt
¼ asIð1 sI  sPðtÞÞ  bð1 sI  sPðtÞÞsPðtÞ ð2Þ
The equilibrium state of the population can be obtained from dsPðtÞ
dt
¼ 0, which reads
bsPðtÞ2  ðasI þ bð1 sIÞÞsPðtÞ þ asIð1 sIÞÞ ¼ 0 ð3Þ
The two solutions of Eq (3) read
< sP >¼
asI þ bð1 sIÞ 
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
½asI þ bð1 sIÞ2  4basIð1 sIÞ
q
2b
ð4Þ
where<σP> is the equilibrium value of peaceful agents. Those values simplify to
< sP >¼
(
1 sI  p1
a
b sI  p2
ð5Þ
which implies the two associated equilibrium opponent values
< sO >¼
(
0
1 aþbb sI
ð6Þ
Indeed Eq (2) can be solved analytically to yield
sPðtÞ ¼ p2 þ
p1  p2
1 sPð0Þp1sPð0Þp2 ebðp1p2Þt
ð7Þ
Fig 1 shows the evolution of the system on varying the initial conditions.
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0.1 Analysis of the Stability
We analyze the respective stability ranges for p1 and p2:
dsP
dt
ðsPÞ ’
dsP
dt
ð< sP >Þ þ ðsP < sP >Þl ð8Þ
where dsP
dt
ð< sP >Þ ¼ 0 and l  d
2sP
dtdsP
j<sP>, we obtain
l ¼ ½asI þ bð1 sIÞ þ 2bsP ð9Þ
Fig 1. Evolution of the system on varying initial conditions. a σI = 0.3, and σO = 0.3, α = 1.0, β = 1.0. b σI = 0.3, and σO = 0.3, α = 1.0, β = 2.0. c σI = 0.3,
and σO = 0.3, α = 4.0, β = 2.0. d σI = 0.28, and σO = 0.02, α = 0.5, β = 0.5. e σI = 0.3, and σO = 0.3, α = 1.0, β = 5.0. f σI = 0.1, and σO = 0.4, α = 4.0, β = 2.0. g
σI = 0.1, and σO = 0.4, α = 12.0, β = 2.0. h σI = 0.1, and σO = 0.4, α = 22.0, β = 2.0. i σI = 0.28, and σO = 0.7, α = 0.5, β = 0.5.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0155407.g001
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Therefore, for respective values p1, p2 we obtain(
l1 ¼ asI þ bð1 sIÞ ¼ bðp1  p2Þ
l2 ¼ asI  bð1 sIÞ ¼ bðp1  p2Þ
ð10Þ
Stability being achieved for λ< 0, Eq (10) shows that p1(p2) is stable when p1< p2(p1> p2).
Accordingly we get two stable regimes:(
p1  p2()sI  Ic
p1  p2()sI  Ic
ð11Þ
with Ic  baþb. These two regimes yield the respective equilibrium values for peaceful and oppo-
nent agents as from Eqs (5) and (6)(< sP >¼ p1 ¼ 1 sI; < sO >¼ 0
< sP >¼ p2 ¼ ab sI ; < sO >¼ 1 sIIc ¼ p1  p2
ð12Þ
The ﬁrst equation of system (12) highlights that in some conditions the amount of opponent
agents is equal to zero. Hence, we perform a further investigation to study under which condi-
tions it is possible to avoid the phenomenon of radicalization (i.e., by reaching the equilibrium
state<σO> = 0). In terms of opinion dynamics these results indicate that under appropriate
conditions it is possible to remove one opinion from the system. Given the relevance of this
outcome in the related context, i.e., criminal activities and terrorism, we explore in more details
this result.
0.2 Extinction processes
From the above results radicalization can be totally thwarted if σI Ic. Accordingly, given σI
and β the individual involvement for the inflexible population in striking up with individual
opponents must be at least at a level
a >
1
sI
 1
 
b ð13Þ
Therefore, as seen from Eq (13) the larger σI the less effort is required from the inﬂexible popu-
lation. However, the more active are the opponents (i.e., larger β) the more involvement is
required. To visualize the multiplicative factor by which αmust overpass β it is worth to draw
the curve 1sI  1 as a function of σI as shown in Fig 2. From Eq (13) it is seen that to prevent rad-
icalization inﬂexible agents’s involvement must be either lower (α< β) or larger (α> β) than
that of opponents depending on the magnitude of the multiplicative factor 1sI  1. When
1
sI
 1 < 1, i.e., sI > 12 core agents do not need to much individual engagement as could be
expected in the case of a coexistence of a core majority population with a sensitive minority
subpopulation. More precisely, the engagement depends on the opponent activism but the core
population beneﬁting from its majority status. In this case its requirement is always lower than
the opponent involvement. However, the situation turns difﬁcult when the initial sensitive
minority turns to a majority status as it occurred in some speciﬁc urban areas. In that case to
avoid a radicalization requires a very high individual engagement from the core agents, which
may be rather hard to implement. In particular since no collective information is available
about the situation. We thus have three different cases: 1) sI >
1
2
, 2) sI ¼ 12, and 3) sI < 12 to
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consider to determine the respective level of individual core involvement to avoid the phenom-
enon of radicalization.
Case 1. For sI >
1
2
core agents need little involvement to thwart totally the radicalization of
the sensitive subpopulation with values of αmuch lower than β. Indeed, opponent agents need
to produce very high values of β (compared to α) to survive, precisely the condition b  asIð1sI Þ
must be satisﬁed. However, very large values of β can shrink to zero the amount of peaceful
agents yielding a fully radicalized sensitive population, which although in a small minority sta-
tus may produce substantial violence against inﬂexible agents.
Case 2. For sI ¼ 12 the opponent activism must be counter with an equal core counter activ-
ism since α βmakes opponent agents to extinct. Instead, for α< β peaceful and opponent
agents coexist and the former disappear for large values of β with again a fully radicalized sensi-
tive population with<σO> = σI.
Case 3. For values sI <
1
2
, if α = β the equilibrium condition entails that<σP> = σI (and
<σO> = 1 − 2σI). If α> β, we can reach the extinction of opponent agents as
sI
Ic
¼ 1. In con-
trast when α< β opponent agents strongly prevail in the population.
Fig 2. The curve 1sN  1 is shown as a function of σN. All cases for which the value of ab is above the curve (yellow, clear) correspond to situations for which
radicalization is totally thwarted. When the value of ab is below the curve (blue, dark) radicalization takes place on a permanent basis.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0155407.g002
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0.3 Degree of radicalization
In order to asses the degree of radicalization in a population we can introduce two parameters:
z and η. The former is defined to evaluate the fraction of opponent agents among flexible
agents while the latter (i.e., η) evaluates the ratio between opponent and inflexible agents.
Therefore, z represents the relative ratio of opponents among flexible agents and η gives a mea-
sure about the real power of opponents agents in a population. An high value of z (i.e., close to
1) in a population with σI>>0.5 indicates that strategies to fight radicalization are too weak
but at the same time opponents are few. Therefore, in this case governments should take an
action even if the situation seems still under control. On the other hand, a low value of z (i.e.,
close to 0) together with a high value of η represent an alarming situation. Indeed, even if there
are only a few opponents among flexible agents their amount is bigger than that of inflexible
ones [52]. To evaluate these measures, z and η have been defined as follows( z ¼ sO
1sI
Z ¼ sOsI
ð14Þ
hence, recalling that σO = 1 − σI − σP and having solved analytically σP(t) (see Eq (7)) we are
able to compute values of both parameters z and η at equilibrium and on varying the initial
conditions—see Fig 3. It is worth to note that the parameter z as deﬁned in Eq (14) has a range
in [0, 1]. At equilibrium z = 0 means that there are no opponent agents in the population while
z = 1 means that all ﬂexible agents became opponents. On the other hand, the parameter η has
potentially an unlimited range from 0 to1 (in the case σI is very close to 0 and σO to 1). To
conclude, we want to emphasize the meaningful role of the two parameters z and η. They rep-
resent a way to quantify in which extent radicalization phenomena are taking place in a popu-
lation. Moreover, in more general terms we envision a further utilization of these parameters in
opinion dynamics since they clearly indicate the prevalence of one opinion/state over another
one.
Policy implications of the results
The recent anti-western terrorist attacks [26] in Europe have brought the question of radicali-
zation at a top priority of policy maker agenda of the different European governments. In par-
ticular, most of the terrorists involved in the various killings which took place in several
European capitals were either National citizens or legal residents. This very fact points to the
direct link existing between terrorism and radicalization [53]. Indeed, various institutions are
faced with the difficult issue to implement innovative procedures to stop if not eradicate radi-
calization. The task turns out to be rather hard since radicalization has been prospering quietly
in different areas of European countries for now many years without any substantial barrier. It
has been a sensitive political issue and most officials had preferred the laissez-faire instead of
addressing the problem in solid terms. The dramatic scores of 2015 Paris and 2016 Brussels
attacks have now prompted the necessity to face the problem and start implementing counter
measures. The burden is on European governments to find ways to tackle the radicalization.
Almost everyone is expecting action from the states. But the states seem to have no solid
scheme to apply. One direction has been along the education side with the setting up of so-
called de-radicalization programs. However, such an approach concerns identified radicals
who have been arrested. All efforts and thoughts are focused on acting on radicalized citizens.
Coercive measures are implemented against known associations and active leaders. Even to
contain radicalization appears to be a challenging task. Our model, although rather simple puts
light on the process by which the phenomenon of radicalization spreads over within a sensitive
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population. It articulates around the capacity of radicalized agents to turn radical otherwise
peaceful agents who had chosen to coexist with the native population sharing their habitat.
This capacity is embedded in the coefficient β. In addition, the main novelty of our model is to
account for the possible capacity of native agents to overturn radical agents in making them
choose the peaceful state quantified with the coefficient α. Moreover, the ratio of native versus
sensitive populations (1sIsI ) was found to be a critical parameter. In the past this ratio was rather
stable over time with slow evolution. It made feasible to evaluate the activeness of radicals,
which has been not meaningful for decades. However, rather quick changes may occur in the
demography of the sensitive populations especially with the substantial increase of recent years
immigration. On this basis, our results show how the overall situation can be totally put upside
Fig 3. Radicalization degree quantified according to the parameters ζ and η, on varying initial conditions. a σI = 0.3, and σO = 0.3, α = 1.0, β = 1.0. b σI
= 0.3, and σO = 0.3, α = 2.0, β = 1.0. c σI = 0.3, and σO = 0.3, α = 1.0, β = 2.0. d σI = 0.3, and σO = 0.3, α = 4.0, β = 1.0.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0155407.g003
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down (1sIsI < 1!
1sI
sI
> 1) with respect to the extent of current radicalization while not much
seems to have happened with respect to radical activities. Keeping the same level of activeness
from radicals, a slow change in the population ratio may produce a sudden spreading of radi-
calization. Therefore the knowledge of the evolution of the current ratio of populations is a key
parameter to evaluate the associated potential of radicalization spreading. And yet, in many
countries like France, ethnic statistics are forbidden. Most of curbing radicalization still
involves the state and diverse ofﬁcial institutions. In contrast the phenomenon of radicalization
results from informal interactions among sensitive and radical agents. At this point our results
unveiled a new and unexpected promising path to ﬁght radicalization. An innovative strategy
could be implemented by launching a citizen counter radicalization movement mapped from
the path used by opponents to spread radicalization within the sensitive population. Instead of
being the sole prerogative of National Authorities de-radicalization would become a citizen
matter. The same way a radical tries to turn a peaceful sensitive agent to hostility towards the
natives, natives can try to bring back opponents to peaceful coexistence. Normal citizens would
have to engage in personal interactions with sensitive agents to establish a solid ground for
coexistence. The required degree of efﬁcient citizen involvement can be clearly identiﬁed using
the degree of activeness of the radicals and the ratio of subpopulations, native versus sensitive.
While this ratio is at the exclusive hand of national authorities, the citizen involvement is a citi-
zen prerogative. In addition, the centrality of the ratio of subpopulations within a given terri-
tory emphasizes the importance of avoiding a de-mixing of the subpopulations. In case of a
different discriminating distribution of the subpopulations within distinct sub-territories, radi-
calization would be enhance at once with the same proportion of radical due the large value of
1sI
sI
within the sub-territory where the sensitive population is mostly conﬁned.
0.4 Remark
It is worth to notice that the proposed model may in principle be applied also to criminal and
terrorist scenarios in homogeneous populations as it occurred in the cases of Italian Red Bri-
gades and French Revolution. These two cases are concerned with homogeneous populations
as both inflexible, peaceful and opponent agents belong to the local core population. In the for-
mer case (i.e., red brigades) inflexible agents represent individuals who respect laws and believe
in institutions and governments. Individuals having a different behavior can fall in the mild
category of peaceful agents or in the extreme category of opponents (i.e., criminals). Instead, in
the case of the French revolution inflexible agents represent the small proportion of French
nobility. The remaining part of the population is represented by peaceful and opponent agents.
There, the extremely difficult life conditions fed opponent ideals and the wide proportion of
the sensible subpopulation became completely opponent giving rise to a revolution.
Conclusion
To summarize we have identified the equilibrium state of a mixed population in terms of order
or disorder phases. We have also identified the ratio between social strategies and the strength
of opponents’ ideal. Since we refer to the concept of social strategies it is worth to emphasize
that although the considered scenario can be modeled in various ways as those based on evolu-
tionary games. There the concept of “strategy” acquires a particular meaning. Here we develop
a model based on opinion dynamics processes. As a result social strategies are embodied in a
parameter while updating rules depend on the density of different opinions in the population.
Moreover, in this context opinions refer to the different cultural extractions and behaviors that
can be observed in an heterogeneous population. We remark that today the question of de-
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radicalization has became a key priority issue of internal security in European countries. Yet
the challenge is intact with no ready to use solution. Different state agencies are launching a
series of experimental treatments but all are concerned with institutional managing of the
issue. Given the acute current terrorist threat people are expecting and requesting policy mak-
ers to take initiative to curb the current phenomenon of radicalization within sensitive local
populations. Unlike this heavy policy trend our study has enlightened the crucial role so called
“normal citizens” could play to stop the spreading of radicalism. It could even shrink it back
with a serious perspective to eventually eradicate the actual growing threat set in European cit-
ies. From our results it appears that an efficient action should not be limited to state involve-
ment but also to call on individual voluntary engagement within their respective
neighborhoods towards the sensitive individuals. Given an evaluation of radical activeness
within some sensitive neighborhoods we were able to calculate the required degree of “normal
citizen” counter-activeness to curb radicalization. This degree of engagement was also found to
depend on the ration of native to sensitive populations. Focusing on local interactions in the
modeling of these dynamics underlines the instrumental role neighborhood compositions can
have in the shaping of the social behavior of the corresponding subpopulations. Today it often
happens that people of different cultures are fostered to coexist together in the same district of
a city occupying each a series of connected blocks. The connection with natives is thus drasti-
cally reduced jeopardizing opportunities of real integration even after a few generations. In
addition, within some delimited urban areas the majority group is no longer the native subpop-
ulation. At the same time it is still majority in a close by other area. Accordingly given the same
tiny proportion of opponents with the same degree of activeness in the two neighborhoods,
one ends up highly radicalized while the other stays very peaceful. Local interactions and the
degree of mixing are key factors to undermine the spreading of radicalization. A free and
uncontrolled (by authorities) settling of people often leads to a geographical concentration of
sensitive subpopulations. As a result this process may spontaneously develop a natural ground
for the emergence of hate towards native individuals. People are thus lead towards the strength-
ening of the initial culture differences, which results in the establishment of social distances
with native individuals despite being physically very close to them. To conclude, we want to
highlight that our work creates a first step to envision new policies to support campaigns pro-
moting the daily life sharing among people from different cultural backgrounds. In particular,
we focus on methods that potentially may lead “radical neighbors” to the choice of coexistence,
i.e., renouncing to fight against the native population. At least we hope our results will trigger
more research along this path of individuals engaging to establish a peaceful coexistence with
sensitive agents. At this stage further studies along this direction are required, in particular
from a computational social science perspective. It should be possible to identify earlier traces
(i.e., Big Data) and seeds of radical behavior in social networks. Suitable tools to quantify their
strength are also required. Last but not least, we would like to stress that although we have been
mentioning criminal activities we are not judging neither the motivations nor the ideal of
opponent agents. Indeed, they can be considered negative (as in the case of current anti-west-
ern terrorism) or positive (as today in the case of the French revolution) depending both on the
side taken and the chosen epoch. Our aim was to study the conditions of emergence or vanish-
ing of radicalization as a social phenomenon independently of a moral judgment.
Acknowledgments
MAJ would like to thank Fondazione Banco di Sardegna for supporting his work. This work
was supported in part by a convention DGA-2012 60 0013 00470 75 01.
Modeling Radicalization Phenomena in Heterogeneous Populations
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0155407 May 11, 2016 12 / 15
Author Contributions
Conceived and designed the experiments: SG MAJ. Performed the experiments: SG MAJ. Ana-
lyzed the data: SG MAJ. Contributed reagents/materials/analysis tools: SG MAJ. Wrote the
paper: SG MAJ.
References
1. Borum R. Radicalization into Violent Extremism I: A Review of Social Science Theories. Journal of Stra-
tegic Security. 2011; 4(4): 7–36
2. Milko, Marie, Salah, Elodie. . . les victimes des attentats du 13 novembre. Le Monde. 2015; Available:
http://www.lemonde.fr/attaques-a-paris/article/2015/11/15/guillaume-quentin-marie-les-victimes-des-
attentats-du-13-novembre_4810428_4809495.html
3. Brussels Attacks NBC News. 2016; Available: http://http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/brussels-
attacks
4. Thompson RL. Radicalization and the Use of Social Media. Journal of Strategic Security 2011; 4
(4):167–190 doi: 10.5038/1944-0472.4.4.8
5. Haines HH. Black Radicalization and the Funding of Civil Rights. Social Problems. 1984; (32: ) 1: 31–
43 doi: 10.2307/800260
6. Kruglanski AW, Gelfand MJ, Belanger JJ, Sheveland A, Hetiarachchi M, Gunaratna R. The Psychology
of Radicalization and Deradicalization: How Significance Quest Impacts Violent Extremism. Advances
in Political Psychology. 2014; 35(1).
7. Charlie Hebdo. visé par une attaque terroriste, deuil national décrété. Le Monde. 2015; Available:
http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2015/01/07/attaque-au-siege-de-charlie-hebdo_4550630_3224.
html#
8. Galam S. Sociophysics: a review of Galammodels. International Journal of Modern Physics C. 2008;
19(3):409–440. doi: 10.1142/S0129183108012297
9. Castellano C, Fortunato S, Loreto V. Statistical physics of social dynamics. Rev. Mod. Phys. 2009; 81
(2): 591–646. doi: 10.1103/RevModPhys.81.591
10. Buechel B, Hellmann T, Klobner S. Opinion dynamics and wisdom under conformity. Journal of Eco-
nomic Dynamics and Control 2015; 52: 240–257. doi: 10.1016/j.jedc.2014.12.006
11. Sznajd-Weron K, Sznajd J. Opinion Evolution in Closed Community. International Journal of Modern
Physics C. 2000; 11(6): 1157. doi: 10.1142/S0129183100000936
12. Javarone MA. Social influences in opinion dynamics: the role of conformity. Physica A: Statistical
Mechanics and its Applications. 2014; 414: 19–30. doi: 10.1016/j.physa.2014.07.018
13. Javarone MA. Networks strategies in election campaigns. Journal of Statistical Mechanics: Theory and
Experiments. 2014; P08013. doi: 10.1088/1742-5468/2014/8/P08013
14. Sood V, Redner S. Voter Model on Heterogeneous Graphs. Phys. Rev. Lett. 2005; 94(17): 178701.
doi: 10.1103/PhysRevLett.94.178701
15. Javarone MA, Armano G. Emergence of Acronyms in a Community of Language Users. European
Physical Journal - B. 2013; 86(11): 474. doi: 10.1140/epjb/e2013-40662-5
16. D’Orsogna M, Perc M. Statistical physics of crime: A review. Phys. Life Rev. 2015; 12: 1–21. doi: 10.
1016/j.plrev.2014.11.001 PMID: 25468514
17. Galam S. The September 11 attack: A percolation of individual passive support. European Physical
Journal B. 2002; 26: 269–272.
18. Galam S. Global physics: from percolation to terrorism, guerilla warfare and clandestine activities. Phy-
sica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications. 2003; 330: 139–149. doi: 10.1016/j.physa.2003.08.
035
19. Javarone MA, Galam S. Emergence of extreme opinions in social networks. Lecture Notes on Com-
puter Science, Springer. 2015. doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-15168-7_15
20. Gracia-Lazaro C, Quijandria F, Hernandez L, Floria LM, Moreno Y. Co-evolutionary network approach
to cultural dynamics controlled by intollerance. Phys. Rev. E. 2011; 84(6): 067101. doi: 10.1103/
PhysRevE.84.067101
21. Goncalves S, Laguna MF, Iglesias JR. Why, when, and how fast innovations are adopted. European
Physical Journal—B. 2012; 85:192. doi: 10.1140/epjb/e2012-30082-6
22. McMillon D, Simon CP, Morenoff J. Modeling the Underlying Dynamics of the Spread of Crime. PloS
ONE. 2014; 9(4): e88923. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0088923 PMID: 24694545
Modeling Radicalization Phenomena in Heterogeneous Populations
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0155407 May 11, 2016 13 / 15
23. Nizamani S, Memon N, Galam S. From public outrage to the burst of public violence: An epidemic-like
model. Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications. 2014; 416: 620–630. doi: 10.1016/j.
physa.2014.09.006
24. Qian S, Liu Y, Galam S. Activeness as a key to counter democratic balance. Physica A: Statistical
Mechanics and its Applications. 2015; 432: 187–196. doi: 10.1016/j.physa.2015.03.029
25. Galam S, Mauger A. On reducing terrorism power: a hint from physics. Physica A: Statistical Mechanics
and its Applications. 2003; 323: 695–704. doi: 10.1016/S0378-4371(03)00006-2
26. Network of terror: how DAESH uses adaptive social networks to spread its message. 2015; Available:
http://stratcomcoe.org/network-terror-how-daesh-uses-adaptive-social-networks-spread-its-message
27. Wu ZX, Holme P. Effects of strategy-migration direction and noise in the evolutionary spatial prisoner’s
dilemma. Phys. Rev. E. 2010; 80(2): 026108. doi: 10.1103/PhysRevE.80.026108
28. Perc M, Grigolini P. Collective behavior and evolutionary games – An introduction. Chaos, Solitons &
Fractals. 2013; 56: 1–5. doi: 10.1016/j.chaos.2013.06.002
29. Nowak MA. Evolutionary Dynamics: Exploring the Equations of Life. Harvard University Press; 2006.
30. Tomassini M. Introduction to evolutionary game theory. Proc. Conf. on Genetic and evolutionary com-
putation companion. 2014.
31. Javarone MA. Statistical Physics of the Spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma with Memory-Aware Agents Euro-
pean Physical Journal—B. 2016; 89(42).
32. Battiston F, Cairoli A, Nicosia V, Baule A, Latora V. Interplay between consensus and coherence in a
model of interacting opinions. Physica D In press. 2016
33. Li Q, Braunstein LA, Wang H, Shao J, Stanley HE, Havlin S. Non-consensus opinion models on com-
plex networks. Journal of Statistical Physics. 2013; 151: 92–112. doi: 10.1007/s10955-012-0625-4
34. Crokidakis N, Castro de Oliveira PM. Inflexibility and independence: Phase transitions in the majority-
rule model. Phys Rev E. 2015; 92: 062122. doi: 10.1103/PhysRevE.92.062122
35. Crokidakis N, Anteneodo C. Role of conviction in nonequilibrium models of opinion formation. Phys
Rev E. 2012; 86: 061127. doi: 10.1103/PhysRevE.86.061127
36. Crokidakis N, Blanco VH, Anteneodo C. Impact of contrarians and intransigents in a kinetic model of
opinion dynamics. Phys Rev E. 2014; 89: 013310. doi: 10.1103/PhysRevE.89.013310
37. PickeringW, Szymanski BK, Lim C. Opinion Diversity and the Stability of Social Systems: Implications
from a Model of Social Influence; 2016. Preprint. Available: arXiv:1512.03390v3. Accessed 7 March
2016.
38. Cheon T, Morimoto J. Balancer effects in opinion dynamics. Physics Letters A. 2016; 380(3): 429–434.
doi: 10.1016/j.physleta.2015.11.012
39. Oliveira M, Barbosa-Filho H, Yehle T, White S, Menezes R. From Criminal Spheres of Familiarity to
Crime Networks. Studies in Computational Intelligence. 2015; 597: 219–230. doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-
16112-9_22
40. White S, Yehle T, Serrano H, Oliveira M, Menezes R. The Spatial Structure of Crime in Urban Environ-
ments. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. 2015; 8852: 102–111. doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-15168-7_
14
41. Burghardt K, RandWM, Girvan M. Competing opinions and stubbornness: connecting models to data.
SSRN; 2014.
42. Xie J, Sreenivasan S, Korniss G, ZhangW, Lim C, Szymanski BK. Social consensus through the influ-
ence of committed minorities. Phys Rev E. 2011; 84: 011130. doi: 10.1103/PhysRevE.84.011130
43. Garcia-Diaz C, Zambrana-Cruz G, vanWitteloostuijn A. Political spaces, dimensionality decline and
party competition. Advances in Complex Systems. 2013; 16(6): 1350019. doi: 10.1142/
S0219525913500197
44. Dixit AK, Weibull JW. Political polarization. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. 2007;
104(18): 7351–7356. doi: 10.1073/pnas.0702071104
45. Galam S. Heterogeneous beliefs, segregation, and extremism in the making of public opinions. Phys
Rev E. 2005; 71: 046123. doi: 10.1103/PhysRevE.71.046123
46. Alizadeh M, Cioffi-Revilla C. Activation Regimes in Opinion Dynamics: Comparing Asynchronous
Updating Schemes. Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation. 2015; 18(3): 8. doi: 10.18564/
jasss.2733
47. Javarone MA, Squartini T. Conformism-driven phases of opinion formation on heterogeneous net-
works: the q-voter model case. Journal of Statistical Mechanics: Theory and Experiment. 2015;
P10002. doi: 10.1088/1742-5468/2015/10/P10002
Modeling Radicalization Phenomena in Heterogeneous Populations
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0155407 May 11, 2016 14 / 15
48. Galam S, Jacobs F. The role of inflexible minorities in the breaking of democratic opinion dynamics.
Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications. 2007; 381: 366–376. doi: 10.1016/j.physa.2007.
03.034
49. Pastor-Satorras R, Vespignani A. Epidemic spreading in scale-free networks. Phys Rev Let. 2001; 86:
3200. doi: 10.1103/PhysRevLett.86.3200
50. Lagorio C, Migueles MV, Braunstein LA, Lopez E, Macri PA. Effects of epidemic threshold definition on
disease spread statistics. Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications. 2009; 388: 755–763.
doi: 10.1016/j.physa.2008.10.045
51. Bailey N. The Mathematical Theory of Infectious Diseases and its Applications. Griffin, London; 1975.
52. Kelling GL, Coles CM. Fixing BrokenWindows: Restoring Order and Reducing Crime in Our Communi-
ties. Simon and Schuster; 1997.
53. Aronson E, Wilson T, Akert RM. Social Psychology. Pearson Ed; 2006.
Modeling Radicalization Phenomena in Heterogeneous Populations
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0155407 May 11, 2016 15 / 15
